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As the Obama-administration announced, addition-
ally to assurance measures, deterrence will become 
a new pillar of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) 
and European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) from 
next year.
2
 For this reason, the administration seeks 
to increase the budget of OAR and ERI significantly 
to 3.4 billion USD for FY2017. This decision came 
into power after RAND Corporation pointed out 
that according to the currently foreseeable scenarios 
in case of a hypothetical armed aggression, Russian 
forces could reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga 
within 60 hours, leaving NATO with a limited num-
ber of risky options, including an escalatory nuclear 
strike.
3
 Thus ERI and OAR aim to increase U.S. 
non-nuclear deterrence capabilities in Europe in 
order to avoid a limited Russian attack on the East-
ern Flank of NATO. 
In terms of structure, the first section of the 
study starts with a short overview of the concept of 
deterrence, while the second, drawing on the theo-
retical pillars, introduces the most important as-
pects of OAR and ERI. Through the introduction to 
deterrence theory and the subsequent empirical 
analysis of ERI and OAR, this study concludes that 
these steps create only the false image of deterrence, 
while the very essence of the increased U.S. presence 
in Europe is still about assurance. Nevertheless, and 
in contrast with the RAND study, we do not argue 
that this strategy of the Obama-administration 
would be fully inefficient. On the one hand, it helps 
to avoid the return of Cold War era uncertainty 
with its negative spirals and unintended conse-
quences, while on the other hand it pushes Europe-
an allies towards more nuanced defense politics, and 
does not disrupt the process of U.S. rebalancing 
either. 
 
The concept of deterrence 
 
To demonstrate why the Obama-administration could 
only create a false image of deterrence, it is important 
to introduce the main conceptual pillars of the theory. 
In one of his most influential works, Robert Jervis ar-
gued that in some cases “to avoid disastrous situation, 
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Executive summary 
 In 2015 RAND Corporation pointed out 
that according to war-gaming scenarios in 
case of a hypothetical armed aggression, 
Russian forces could reach the outskirts 
of Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours, leav-
ing NATO with a limited number of risky 
options, including an escalatory nuclear 
strike. 
 As an answer for the Russian aggression 
in Ukraine and the demonstrated vulnera-
bility, the Obama-administration an-
nounced that in addition to assurance 
measures, deterrence will become a new 
pillar of Operation Atlantic Resolve 
(OAR) and European Reassurance Initia-
tive (ERI) from 2017. 
 OAR and ERI create only a false image of 
deterrence since the introduced measures 
are clearly not in line with the proposi-
tions of Rand Corporation. Nevertheless, 
OAR and ERI are heavily building on the 
assurance of the European partners. 
 Although OAR and ERI can create only a 
false image of deterrence, this study sees 
this as a ‘better option’ and does not agree 
with RAND Corporation to significantly 
increase the number of permanently de-
ployed U.S. forces in Europe which could 
not cease the risk of uncertainty and 
would lead only to a negative spiral and 
an arms race. 
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the state must display the ability and willingness to wage war.”4 This is probably the most important element 
of the concept of deterrence. It emerges from the uncertainty, since one actor can never be sure about the in-
tentions of the other. As Herbert Butterfield points out, this element of uncertainty is what causes the tragic 
predicament in every human conflicts – that even though both powers wants to anxiously avoid war, their best 
intentions may fail as they cannot be sure about the goals of the other.
5
 And this provides them only a limited 
number of options – most importantly to increase their security through different measures – including deter-
rence. 
As Brown and Arnold summarize the essence of deterrence: if an actor (A) perceives a threat of an attack 
from B, than A tries to alter B’s plan by promising certain retaliation which leads to such damage to B that it 
outweighs any potential gains from the original aggression.
6
 For a successful deterrence B has to receive, un-
derstand and believe A’s measures while B also has to calculate the costs of his aggression.7 The main prob-
lem is that one can never be sure when deterrence works, only when it fails.
8
 
For this reason, the concept of deterrence has to operate with a significant amount of uncertainty. Even if 
it is successful, the predicament again is that B cannot be sure whether these deterrence measures seek only to 
increase security or also to prepare for an attack.
9
 Thus it is possible that B introduces counter measures, 
which pushes A to increase her deterrence activity again.
10
 And even though both actors are perfectly peaceful, 
a negative spiral and an arms race emerge between them which make the stakes higher and higher.
11
 These 
unintended consequences became more and more relevant with the appearance of nuclear weapons but the 
basic logic of deterrence has still remained the same. It builds on the perception of fear through the promise of 
retaliation in order to avoid war. 
This is obviously a narrow and incomplete introduction of the concept of deterrence but this study does 
not aim to present the whole deterrence literature. My goal is rather to build on this short conceptual introduc-
tion and highlight that the Obama administration used the word deterrence not in line with its theoretical foun-
dations. This is relevant, since according to the administration’s interpretation OAR, as well as ERI, will heav-
ily build on deterrence measures from FY2017. 
The administration’s decision can be seen as an answer for the analysis of the RAND Corporation which 
argued that the Russian forces could reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours in a limited attack, 
leaving NATO only with risky options, including an escalatory nuclear strike.
12
 Thus the main goal of OAR 
and ERI is to introduce non-nuclear deterrence measures, and for this reason I will also examine non-nuclear 
deterrence only. The second part of the study will be an empirical analysis of the OAR and ERI measures, 
which can help us understand why the current non-nuclear deterrence measures are only imagined and do not 
provide real deterrence against a limited Russian attack. 
 
Operation Atlantic Resolve and the European Reassurance Initiative 
 
President Barack Obama initiated Operation Atlantic Resolve in April 2014 and European Reassurance Initia-
tive during the summer of 2014. Operation Atlantic Resolve aimed to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to 
collective security and the commitment to the security of every ally, to augment air, ground and naval pres-
ence in the European region as well as to increase NATO readiness through Article 5 related trainings in order 
to deter Russia from regional hegemony.
13
 Additionally to OAR, European Reassurance Initiative was estab-
lished separately as a 1-year-long emergency budget with 1 billion USD for FY2015, to conduct multinational 
military exercises and trainings, to increase the responsiveness of U.S. NATO forces by pre-positioning of the 
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equipment, to support non-NATO allies (especially Ukraine) as well as to increase the persistent U.S. presence 
in the continent.
14
 In 2015, the program was renewed with 789 million USD for FY2016 and ERI came under 
the heading of OAR for 2016.
15
 Until this time, the main pillars of the operation did not change significantly, 
except that the support to Ukraine was no longer financed under the umbrella of OAR.
16
 However, FY2017 
can bring a significant change in the visibility as well as the impact of OAR and ERI since the proposed budg-
et seeks to increase its funding to approximately 3.4 billion USD.
17
 According to the Obama-administration, 
this means that the operations will not only reassure European allies but also build on deterrence measures 
through the improvement of readiness and responsiveness.
18
 Meanwhile, the main geographic focus of OAR 
will remain Russia and Eastern Europe.
19
 Table 1 summarizes the most important shifts in the budget alloca-
tions through the three years of OAR. 
 
 
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) 
(Dollars in Millions) 
 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 
Category Enacted Enacted Request 
Increased Presence 423.1 471.4 1,049.8 
Additional Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises 40.6 108.4 163.1 
Enhanced Prepositioning 136.1 57.8 1,903.9 
Improved Infrastructure 196.5 89.1 217.4 
Building Partnership Capacity 13.7 62.6 85.5 
ERI Transfer Fund 175.0 - - 
Total: 
 
985.0 789.3 3,419.7 
Table 1: European Reassurance Initiative – budget allocations20 
 
As Table 1 summarizes, ERI has five main pillars. These are increased presence, bilateral and multilateral 
exercises, enhanced prepositioning, improved infrastructure and building partnership capacity. While all of the 
components got larger funding for the FY2017 request, more than 85% of the total budget is dedicated to two 
of them (increased presence and enhanced prepositioning). This means that the proposed deterrence measure 
in the framework of OAR should mostly build on these two elements. In the following, an analysis of the most 
important aspects of each pillar will follow. 
 
Increased presence 
 
After the end of the Cold War the different administrations permanently decreased the U.S. military presence 
in Europe. For today the U.S. European Command can operate with approximately 62000 personnel.
21
 This 
includes two brigade combat teams which are the Army’s basic deployable maneuver units consisting of 4000 
to 5000 troops.
22
 One of them is the 173
rd
 Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy, while the other one is the 
2
nd
 Cavalry Regiment organized as a Stryker brigade combat team in Germany. 
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The ERI request for FY2017 would increase their number with one more brigade combat team through 
continuous troop rotations of U.S. based armored brigade combat teams.
23
 This would mean 9 months rota-
tions from the U.S. to Europe from February 2017.
24
 In addition to this, the FY2017 budget would also allo-
cate a smaller portion of money to maintain the Navy and Marine presence in the Black sea region as well as 
to retain 20 F-15 aircrafts in the 493
rd
 Fighter Squadron at Royal Air Force Base Lakenheath and the providing 
of rotary wing aviation capability for the USEUCOM missions.
25
 
 
Bilateral and multilateral exercises 
 
The most visible aspects of OAR and ERI are the conducted bilateral and multilateral exercises in the territory 
of European member states. In the past few years U.S. forces conducted approximately 150 exercis-
es/trainings/workshops with their European allies and partners. Most of these events were conducted by land 
forces and the Air Force, however, the Navy and Marine Forces participated in many cases as well. 
 
2014 2015 
2016 
(before April 15) 
1 x Norway 2 x Hungary 1 x Norway 
8 x Romania 9 x Romania 1 x Romania 
4 x Bulgaria 6 x Bulgaria 1 x Iceland 
6 x Poland 4 x Poland 3 x Poland 
6 x Germany 6 x Germany 1 x Germany 
1 x Slovenia 1 x Croatia – Slovenia 1 x Germany – Poland 
9 x Baltic region 6 x Baltic region 1 x Baltic region 
1 x France 4 x Baltic region – Poland 1 x Lithuania – Poland 
1 x United Kingdom 1 x United Kingdom 1 x Greece 
1 x Czech Republic 1 x Slo – Czk – Hun 5 x Black Sea 
1 x Iceland 1 x Rom – Hun – Est  
11 x Black Sea 9 x Black Sea  
2 x Baltic Sea 3 x Baltic Sea  
2 x Serbia 4 x Mediterranean Sea  
1 x Moldova 1 x “Western Europe”  
2 x Ukraine 2 x “Eastern Flank”  
1 x Georgia 1 x Netherlands – Bulgaria  
1 x Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 x Ger – Bul – Itl – Rom  
 1 x Ukraine  
 1 x Georgia  
Table 2: Conducted exercises according to their geographic spectrum
26
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As Table 2 summarizes, the main geographic focus of the conducted exercises was Central and Eastern 
Europe. More specifically, Romania, Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, and the Baltic countries hosted most of these 
events. Table 2 also demonstrates that 2014 rather focused on static – one country – trainings, while the num-
ber of ‘mobile’ exercises with multiple places and host nations increased significantly for 2015. An interesting 
shift is that although the original plan of ERI clearly aimed to improve capacity building and interoperability 
in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine,
27
 the 2015 and 2016 numbers show a decrease in this respect.
28
 This sug-
gests that the Obama-administration does not want to risk a closer cooperation with the non-NATO allies in 
the framework of OAR since it could be interpreted as a provocation from the Russian side. 
 
Enhanced pre-positioning 
 
One of the key elements with the largest amount of increased ERI funding (1904 million USD) for FY2017 is 
the enhanced preposition of the military equipment in Europe. For this reason, these Army pre-positioned 
stocks would be the main pillars of OAR’s deterrence measures. According to the plans of the administration, 
by the end of 2017 there will be one pre-positioned set of combat-ready equipment, which can support another 
Armored Brigade Combat Team besides the three other stationing in the European theater.
29
 
As the ATP 3-35.1 doctrine emphasizes, the Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) are essential elements of 
U.S. force projection, since they are significant enablers of the Army’s rapid response.30 These pre-positioned 
elements are the third leg of the Strategic Mobility Triad besides airlift and sealift capabilities.
31
 Their primary 
task is to provide “immediate delivery of large amounts of equipment to meet short-notice crises.”32 Thus APS 
can reduce the workload of airlift while it sustains the Soldier with all necessary equipment until the sea routes 
are established.
33
 On the other hand, the APS can be used as a deterrent capability through the form of training 
exercises.
34
 This is exactly, what we see in the framework of Operation Atlantic Resolve as well. However, 
this does not mean that APS cannot be used outside of its deployment region. As it happened during the prepa-
ration phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army can reposition equipment from any APS through 
strategic airlift or sealift.
35
 Thus they are not dedicated to specific units or theaters, but can be issued to units 
by the Secretary of Defense.
36
 The most important economic aspect of the whole project is that this APS struc-
ture does not need the permanent stationing of the staff and soldiers which can significantly reduce the costs of 
the deployment. 
The Army pre-positioned stocks can be divided according to their characteristics. In this respect, the ATP 
3-35.1 doctrine differentiates between five types of APS: 
 Unit Sets contain equipment configured into unit sets and includes the unit basic load; 
 Operational Project Stocks, which “are materiel above normal table of organization and equipment, 
table of distribution and allowances, and common table of allowance authorizations tailored to key 
strategic capabilities;”  
 Army War Reserve Sustainment Stocks can provide „minimum essential support to combat operations 
and post-mobilization training beyond the capabilities of peacetime stocks, industry, and host nation 
support…These stocks consist of major and secondary end items to sustain the operation by replacing 
combat losses and to replace supplies consumed in the operation;” 
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27 Operation Atlantic Resolve (2014) 
28 Operation Atlantic Resolve (2015) and Operation Atlantic Resolve – Fact Sheet 2016 
29 Operation Atlantic Resolve – Fact Sheet 2016, pp. 1-2. 
30 ATP 3-35.1 Army Pre-Positioned Operations, [online], October, 2015, Source: Armypubs.army.mil [06 01 2016] pp. 1-2. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. p. 1. 
33 Ibid. pp. 1-3. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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 War Reserve Stocks for Allies which can be released to support allied forces. These stocks are also fi-
nanced and owned by the United States; 
 Activity Sets which are pre-positioned in order to support the deployment of the Army outside of the 
U.S. to conduct training and exercises.
37
 
 
The announced APS in the framework of Operation Atlantic Resolve and European Reassurance Initiative 
will be a Unit Set equipment.
38
 Most importantly, it will provide a Division Headquarters, one Armored Bri-
gade Combat Team (ABCT), a Fires Brigade, a Sustainment Brigade, and associated enablers.
39
 On the one 
hand the equipment will be sourced from existing depot stocks, while on the other hand ERI provides 1096 
million for additional procurements as well.
40
 
Those pieces of equipment which will be sourced, are currently used by the rotationally deployed forces 
in Europe. This is the so called European Activity Set or EAS. According to the plans, these “will remain in 
Europe, be repaired, upgraded, and converted into the core of the APS.”41 In its current form the U.S. Army 
European Activity Set is “a combined-arms, battalion-sized group of vehicles and equipment” which is main-
tained at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany.
42
 Its creation was approved by the Army Chief of Staff in 
July, 2012 in order to mitigate the loss of the two deactivated Brigade Combat Teams in Europe.
43
 The Euro-
pean Activity Set (EAS) cannot be used by allies or by any other countries, it exclusively supports the U.S. 
Army.
44
 According to the U.S. Army Fact Sheet, the 2
nd
 Battalion, 5
th
 Cavalry Regiment – a combined arms 
battalion of the 1
st
 Brigade Combat Team, 1
st
 Cavalry Division – is the unit currently designated for the use of 
EAS.
45
 However, this does not mean that the equipment or the vehicles cannot leave the Grafenwoehr Training 
Area. Some of the EAS sites are located on NATO’s Eastern Flank, more specifically in Romania (Mihail 
Kogelniceau Air Base), Bulgaria (Novo Selo Training Area) and Lithuania (Mumaiciai).
46
 According to the 
official data, the EAS consists of 12000 pieces of equipment including 250 tanks and 1750 support vehicles.
47
 
Among these, there are M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks; M2A3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles; A3 
Bradley Support Team Vehicles; M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers; Mortar Carriers; Humwees and 
many other types.
48
 If the EAS is used outside of the Training Area, the equipment and vehicles can be trans-
ported by truck, rail, barge, ferry and aircraft.
49
 As RAND Corporation emphasizes, there are 24 main battle 
tanks and 30 infantry fighting vehicles in the EAS.
50
 With additional procurements, these will provide the key 
equipment of the announced Army pre-positioned stock which will be able to support an Armored Brigade 
Combat Team by the end of FY2017.
51
 
 
Improved infrastructure and Partnership Capacity Building 
 
These two aspects of OAR and ERI mainly aim to support the first three pillars, which were introduced above. 
These include the improvement and modernization of infrastructure elements as well as the construction of 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller): Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, European Reassur-
ance Initiative, [online], February 2016, comptroller.defense.gov [06 28 2016] pp. 16-17. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Operation Atlantic Resolve – Fact Sheet 2016, p. 3. 
42 U.S. Army European Activity Set, [online], Source: Eur.army.mil [06 01 2016] 
43 Craig A. DANIEL, Robin T. DOTHAGER: Resetting the theater to equip rotational forces in Europe, [online], May 2, 2016, Source: 
Army.mil [06 01 2016] 
44 U.S. Army European Activity Set 
45 Ibid. 
46 European Activity Set – Fact Sheet, [online], Source: Eur.army.mil [06 28 2016] 
47 Michael BEHLIN: European Activity Set turn-in officially underway in Lithuania, [online], December 14, 2015, Source: Army.mil 
[06 01 2016] 
48 U.S. Army European Activity Set Major Equipment, [online], Source: Eur.army.mil [Accessed: 06.01.2016] 
49 DANIEL and DOTHAGER 
50 SHLAPAK and JOHNSON, p. 8. 
51 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), pp. 16-17. 
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new facilities. Table 3 introduces the main projects under these headings, which are linked mostly to the de-
velopment of airbases in Central and Eastern European countries. 
 
Place Project Cost 
Keflavik Airfield (Iceland) Facilities Modification for P-8A $ 21.4 million 
Spangdahlem Airbase (Ger-
many) 
Infrastructure to support 5
th
 generation 
fighter rotation ops 
$ 19.8 million 
Amari Airbase (Estonia) Construct a bulk fuel storage capacity $ 6.5 million 
Graf Ignatievo Airbase (Bul-
garia) 
Construct funds Squadron Operations / 
Alert facility 
$ 3.8 million 
Graf Ignatievo Airbase (Bul-
garia) 
Extend a fighter ramp $ 7.0 million 
Campia Turzil Airbase (Ro-
mania) 
Construct a Squadron Operations facil-
ity 
$ 3.4 million 
Campia Turzil Airbase (Ro-
mania) 
Extend a parking apron $ 6.0 million 
Campia Turzil Airbase (Ro-
mania) 
Construct a two-bay hangar $ 6.1 million 
Powidz Airbase (Poland) Construct a Squadron Operations facil-
ity 
$ 4.1 million 
Lask Airbase (Poland) Construct a Squadron Operations facil-
ity 
$ 4.1 million 
Table 3: Main infrastructure developments within ERI
52
 
 
In additional to these, ERI also builds on the improvement of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) capabilities.
53
 The other important aspect of partnership capacity building is the sustainment of the U.S. 
– Ukraine bi-lateral network (Maidan), to facilitate cyber security cooperation in the region.54 
 
Conclusions: No deterrence but still the better option 
 
As the conceptual introduction stated, the main point of deterrence is “that the state must display the ability 
and willingness to wage war”55 in order to avoid disastrous situations in some cases. The empirical analysis of 
Operation Atlantic Resolve and European Reassurance Initiative show that this willingness to wage war with 
Russia is missing from the whole concept. The introduced measures are clearly not in line with the proposi-
tions of Rand Corporation, which suggested to deploy at least seven, combat-ready brigades, including three 
heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the 
ground, in order to balance the Russian deployments and mitigate the threat of a limited attack.
56
 Thus it seems 
unequivocal that ERI as well as OAR, in contrast with their official purpose, are not aimed to increase non-
nuclear deterrence measures, because they are not able to do so in their current forms. Nevertheless, they are 
heavily building on the assurance of the European partners but this is not equal to deterrence. 
This is however not to say that this study agrees with the advices of RAND Corporation to increase the 
U.S. presence in Europe. Even if RAND’s conclusion were right, fulfilling their proposals would be not only 
                                                          
52 Source of the data: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), pp. 19-23. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. 
55 JERVIS, p. 58. 
56 SHLAPAK and JOHNSON, p. 1. 
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extremely expensive
57
 for Washington but they would also fundamentally disrupt the long-term strategy of 
rebalancing. Instead of this, Washington and Europe has to face the truth that similarly to the case of terrorism, 
100% security does not exist. The international system always shows the risk of uncertainty. One can never be 
sure about the intentions of Vladimir Putin or his inner circle. Yes, there is a possibility that Russia will 
choose the option of a limited attack. Yes, OAR and ERI cannot promise adequate retaliation for a limited 
attack but without the permanent increase of U.S. forces in Europe this goal cannot be fulfilled. Even if Wash-
ington would decide to do so, there would sooner or later appear a new security risk which would leave Eu-
rope and the U.S. in a similarly difficult situation – and this is exactly how a negative spiral and an arms race 
could emerge. 
 
  
                                                          
57 According to RAND the total cost of buying three brand-new ABCT would be 13 billion USD. Additionally, their annual operating 
and support cost would be at least 2.7 billion USD, which however, does not include infrastructural and other expenses. Source: 
SHLAPAK and JOHNSON, p. 11. 
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